Consent as a focus of inquiry in citizenship education. Forthcoming in J. I. Forstenzer, F. Demissie, and J. Boontinand (eds), The Community of Philosophical Enquiry as Citizenship Education and its Pedagogy: International Perspectives on Talking Democracy into Action. Routledge.

I think well, therefore I live well: Review of I’ve Been Thinking by Daniel C. Dennett. (Author’s translation of following item)

Σκέφτομαι καλά, άρα ζω καλά. ΤΑ ΝΕΑ, 16-17 December 2023, pp. 12-13.

The paradox of philosophy for children and how to resolve it. Childhood and Philosophy, 16(36): 1-24 (2020).

Tools for thinking: Isaiah Berlin’s two concepts of freedom. Aeon, February 2019.

What we say vs what we mean: what is conversational implicature? Aeon, April 2018.

Conversational Implicature: Re-assessing the Gricean Framework. PhD thesis, University of Sheffield, 2016.

A Greek perspective on austerity psychology (with Keith Frankish). The Psychologist, September 2013.

Scalar implicature: Inference, convention, and dual processes (with Keith Frankish). In K. Manktelow, D. Over & S. Elqayam (eds), The Science of Reason: A Festschrift for Jonathan St. B. T. Evans (pp. 259-81). Psychology Press.


The past decade has seen a flurry of experimental work on the psychological basis of conversational implicature, focusing in particular on the questions of whether implicature processing is automatic or effortful and whether pragmatic interpretations develop before or after logical ones. This chapter reviews this work, assesses its significance, and sets it within a wider theoretical context. In particular, it draws attention to a theoretical option largely ignored in the experimental literature. Most experimental work on implicature has been conducted within a broadly Gricean paradigm, according to which implicatures can be calculated and explained using general psycho-social principles. However, there is an alternative strand in philosophy of language, according to which many implicatures depend on convention rather than inference. We argue that this view should not be ruled out and deserves experimental testing. The chapter also makes connections with the literature on dual-process theories of reasoning, as developed by Jonathan Evans and others. Superficially at least, implicature seems made for a dual-process analysis, and we consider if this is correct. The chapter closes with some suggestions for future experimental work.

Mind and consciousness (with Keith Frankish). In J. Shand (ed.), The Central Issues of Philosophy, (pp. 107-20). Blackwell.

Introducing philosophy. A short introduction to philosophy, originally written for students planning to enrol on the Open University course Philosophy and the Human Situation (A211). The unit is available on the OU’s OpenLearn website.

I need to find myself a Suleiman. Proceedings of the Fourth European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, Lund University, 2002.